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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of globalization and regional integration on the
economic geography within a country consisting of gate and hinterland regions, which
have asymmetric accessibilities to overseas markets. To better explain the reality of
developing countries, we assumed that unskilled workers are employed in both traditional
and manufacturing sectors. Our analytical results could explain both why and where
industrial agglomeration and dispersion arise. We show that when the international trade
cost is very high, the space economy has full agglomeration in the hinterland and then
experiences a process of dispersion until an even industrial distribution exists between the
two domestic regions. When the home country is open enough to world markets, ﬁrms will
ﬁrst concentrate in the hinterland and then gradually move to the gate region until a full
agglomeration occurs during regional integration. With further regional economic integra-
tion, half of ﬁrms will relocate to the hinterland again, with another half of them still
remaining in the gate region.
Key words : asymmetrical accessibilities ; spatial agglomeration ; trade and transport costs ;
industrial relocation
．Introduction
The main conclusions of early NEG models (Krugman, 1991 ; Ottaviano et al., 2002 ;
Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003) tell us that high transport costs lead to the dispersion of
industry in two symmetrical regions and that industrial agglomeration occurs when
transport costs are low. This is also known as the core-periphery theory. As economic
integration proceeds, we must ask : after the core-periphery what will the pattern of
39
39( )
＊ The authors wish to thank Professors Masahisa Fujita and Dao-Zhi Zeng as well as other seminar participants
in the Second Asian Seminar in Regional Science held at Kitakyushu City of Japan in September 2012, for their
useful comments and suggestions. This work was supported by JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science) KAKENHI Grant Number 23530300.
industrial distribution be, and how will the economic landscape change over time ?
Moreover, with agglomeration increasing, the greater concentrations of ﬁrms and mobile
workers in the core regions will lead to the rise of extra costs related to production and
living, such as workersʼ wages, higher land rents, and commuting costs. The further
integration between regions causes the core regions to become over-concentrated, and
some industries will tend to relocate to the periphery. That is to say that the evolution of
spatial development undergoes a bell-shaped process in the long term. When we investi-
gate the space economy of cities or regions within a country, we ﬁnd that industrial
deconcentration and the growth of hinterland regions do not seem to be exclusive
phenomena. It has been observed that in some developed countries, such as the United
Kingdom, the space economy has experienced the process of industrial redispersion (Geyer
and Kontuly, 1996). Similarly, there is ample evidence to show that manufacturing activities
in the United States were heavily agglomerated in the Northeast and Great Lakes in the
1950s. In the ensuing decades, manufacturing has clearly become much more dispersed,
and ﬁrms are much more spread out to the other parts of the country (Holmes and
Stevens, 2004). Also, industrial relocation from the central region to the hinterlands has
even been witnessed in some emerging economies. As demonstrated by Haddad et al.
(2002), the southern regions of Brazil actually experienced industrial redispersion due to
the improvement of infrastructure and regional integration. Note also that Deichmann et al.
(2005) investigated the issue of industrial relocation in Indonesia and found that the
potential improvements in transport encouraged ﬁrm relocation from the core region to the
lagging eastern part of the country. Given the facts outlined above, as Williamson (1965)
observed, countries ﬁrst go through a period of regional inequality and industrial agglomer-
ation in some speciﬁc region and then experience industrial deconcentration and a move
towards regional convergence as economic development proceeds. From the foregoing
discussion, empirical evidence supports the idea that industry tends to agglomerate in
some speciﬁc urban areas or regions during the initial stage of industrialization and that
some industries then relocate to hinterland regions away from congestion or the higher-
waged core region.
It goes without saying that the theory of New Economic Geography (Krugman, 1991)
has been successful in providing the rationales for the occurrence of economic agglomera-
tion. NEG models tell us why agglomeration occurs, but they are largely unconcerned with
where the agglomeration arises. In the early core-periphery models, the decrease in
transport costs led to industrial agglomeration in one of the two regions. In other words,
the two homogeneous regions seem to enjoy the same opportunity to become the center.
This is obviously inconsistent with the real economic world. Generally speaking, the natural
advantages of a region play important roles in choosing the center through their interac-
tion with pure economic forces. Empirical evidence reveals that the regional disparity
increased due to economic liberalization and globalization between 1985 and 1994 in China
and that massive manufacturing ﬁrms agglomerated near the coastal regions, which have
better access to the overseas markets (Fujita and Hu, 2001). Similarly, Gallup et al. (1999)
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argue that in sub-Saharan Africa and some regions in Eastern Europe, the share of the
population living near to coastal areas or ocean-navigable rivers is not high. The extremely
high international trade costs and domestic transport costs result in such agglomeration
within the hinterland. They further show that agglomeration is likely to take place in the
region that has better accessibility when interregional transport costs and international
trade costs are low enough. Thus, we ﬁnd that the occurrence of industrial agglomeration
is not equally likely in any location. The agglomeration generally arises in speciﬁc locations
that are endowed with certain natural advantages, such as transport accessibility.
As Behrens et al. (2006) discussed, NEG has allowed us to combine old ingredients via a
new recipe to explain the formation of economic agglomeration, and the weak point of the
NEG theory is geography itself. When we investigate developed core regions, we ﬁnd that
they are always endowed with some inherent advantage, such as natural resources or a
good location for transport. However, most NEG models rely heavily on the abstract two-
region model for deducing analytical tractability. As Fujita and Mori (2005) advocated, it is
imperative to go beyond the simple two-region models and use asymmetric many-region
models of trade and geography in order to acquire practical and useful policy implications.
We need to give an explicit picture of industrial location during trade liberalization and
regional integration. The same is true of the models of industrial redispersion. The related
models of industrial redispersion are able to oﬀer a reasonable mechanism explaining the
occurrence of industrial deconcentration. Their weakest point is that they fail to tell us
where the agglomeration occurs and where deconcentration comes from. Regarding the
research into industrial redispersion, Tabuchi (1998) observes industrial redispersion by
incorporating the urban costs as additional centrifugal forces. Furthermore, Tabuchi and
Thisse (2002) show that the distribution of industry and trade costs presents a bell-
shaped relationship when taste heterogeneity is employed in their model. It is worth
mentioning that Picard and Zeng (2005, 2010) investigate the process of industrial redisper-
sion by considering the agricultural sector and a diﬀerent production technique. Although
these researches give reasonable explanations for redispersion, where the agglomeration
arises and where redispersion originates are also at issue. In terms of spatial set-up, only a
hypothetical two-region economy is investigated. In contrast to symmetrical considerations,
Behrens et al. (2006) incorporate geographic features into the NEG model. It is a pity that
we could not witness the process of redispersion and that the full agglomeration is always
in the gate region, even if the transport costs are extremely low.
To settle the foregoing issues, it is necessary to add geographical elements into the
original NEG models to explain the explicit industrial location pattern, especially the
process of industrial redispersion. The present paper attempts to merge the study of
industrial redispersion and geographical features within a single model. We develop a
three-region model based on Picard and Zeng (2010). Unskilled workers are invested both
in the traditional sector and in manufacturing ﬁrms. This is consistent with the situation in
most developing countries, where unskilled workers are massively employed in producing
low-end manufacturing goods. More than that, we consider a two-country, three-region case
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in which the home country is asymmetric in terms of its access to overseas markets. This
allows us to analyze the impacts of inherent geography on the reshaping of space
economy, along with the joint role of economic mechanisms. Because there are various
spatial scales in our model, we are able to investigate the complicated interactions between
international trade liberalization and regional integration, as well as their eﬀect on the
distribution of industry.
Using this framework, our analytical results reveal that there are abundant location
patterns resulting from the process of globalization and regional integration. We ﬁnd that
when the home country is closed to global markets, poor domestic infrastructure allows
the hinterland attract all of the manufacturing ﬁrms. With the further integration of the
domestic economy, there will be a balanced distribution of industry between the gate
region and the hinterland. When the country is open to global markets, starting with full
agglomeration in the hinterland, a decrease in transport costs will trigger the ﬁrms to
gradually move to the gate region during the integration of domestic regions. When this
happens, the full concentration in the gate region will be maintained for a long while, even
though the decrease in transport costs continues. With further regional economic integra-
tion, half of ﬁrms will relocate to the hinterland once again, with the other half of them
remaining in the gate region.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. A three-region theoretical model is
presented in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze the impacts of trade liberalization
and regional integration on industrial location within a country. Section 5 provides a brief
summary.
．The model
We extend the work of Picard and Zeng (2010) to a richer spatial setting and consider
a spatial economy consisting of two domestic regions denoted H and G, i. e., the hinterland,
the gate region, and the rest of the world (henceforth, R). Regions G and H are located in
the home country. In the following, variables associated with each region will be sub-
scripted accordingly. The gate region (G) in the domestic economy exhibits a geographical
advantage in terms of better access to world markets, whereas those in the hinterland
must go through the gate region to reach the overseas markets. The geographical access
to trade and transportation is illustrated in Figure 1. There are two production factors in
the economy : geographically mobile skilled workers and immobile unskilled workers. We
denote the mass of skilled workers and unskilled workers in the three regions by L (resp.
A), L (resp. A), and L (resp. A), respectively. We assume that the immobile
unskilled workers, A, are evenly split between the domestic regions H and G, which
means that A=A. In addition to these assumptions, the workers are supposed to be
internationally immobile. Hence, the masses of skilled workers in the home country
(L=L+L) and the rest of the world (L) are considered to be given and ﬁxed. There
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Figure 1．A model of two countries and three regions
Tt
Home country
The rest of world
（R）
The Gate 
region
（G）
The Hinterland
（H）
Notes : t is the interregional transport cost, and T is the international trade cost.
are two production sectors in each region. The traditional sector only employs unskilled
workers at constant returns to scale and supplies a traditional good under perfect
competition. The second sector, called the manufacturing sector, produces a mass N of a
variety of diﬀerentiated manufacturing good under increasing returns to scale and sells its
products under monopolistic competition.
All products can be traded across countries and regions and consequently incur various
unit transport costs. Traditional goods are freely transported between the regions. Trans-
porting diﬀerentiated manufacturing goods across regions is costly. More precisely, we
assume a unit of transport cost of t>0 for shipping any variety of good between domestic
regions, whereas transporting manufacturing goods from the gate region to rest of the
world entails a unit trade cost of T>0. Because we assume that transporting manufactur-
ing goods from hinterland H to R requires going through gate region G, this implies that
ﬁrms located in region H incur trade costs of T+t to access the external global market.
Here, transport costs reﬂect the level of infrastructure in the home country, and trade
costs express the freeness of international trade, i. e., tariﬀs, transport costs, and even
service costs. Given our assumption of asymmetric transport costs, we have :
τ=
T if r=G, s=R or r=R, s=G
t if r=H , s=G or r=G, s=H
T+t if r=H , s=R or r=R, s=H
. Consumers
Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor and has quasi-linear preferences for
three types of goods : manufacturing goods (qi), traditional goods (q , q

 and q

), and
homogenous goods (q) as a numéraire. As in Picard and Zeng (2010), a typical consumer
in region r has the following quasi-linear utility with a quadratic sub-utility function and
chooses her consumption problem:
U=α


qvdv−
β−γ
2 


qv

dv−
γ
2 


qvdv

+q−
1
2
q

+q−
1
2
q
+q−
1
2
q
+q
s. t. 


pvqvdv+p

q

+p

q

+p

q

+q=+q 
Industrial Agglomeration and Dispersion in Gate and Hinterland Regions（WANG・ZHENG) 43
43( )
where α>0 measures the intensity of the preference for the diﬀerentiated products, and
β−γ>0 implies that skilled workers have a preference for variety. q denotes the
consumption of traditional varieties of goods, which are perfectly diﬀerentiated and respec-
tively produced at a constant returns-to-scale sector in the region r=H , G, R. pv is the
consumer price of variety v in region r, and  is the consumerʼs earnings, which depends
on his or her skilled/unskilled status. In addition, q is the consumption of the homogenous
good that is used as a numéraire good. Each worker is endowed with q  initial units of the
numéraire, which is supposed to be large enough for consumption. Finally, the numéraire
is assumed to be transported at zero cost. Its price can be normalized to one without
losing generality.
Using these notations, each consumer maximizes his or her utility given budget con-
straints. It is readily veriﬁed that the linear demand function of manufacturing varieties in
region r is as follows :
qi=a−b+cN pi+cP (1)
where a, b, and c are positive coeﬃcients given by
a=
α
β−N−1γ
, b=
1
β+N−1γ
, c=
γ
β−γβ+N−1γ
And where
P=


pvdv (2)
is the aggregate price index of the diﬀerentiated industry in region r. Then, P =PN can
be interpreted as the average price of the manufacturing products in region r.
Meanwhile, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the consumer plan yield the individual demand
for varieties of goods from the traditional sector in region r. Let p be the price of
traditional varieties of goods produced in region r. Then, the individual demands in region
r are simply given by
q=1−p

 (3)
. Productions
Turning to the supply side, we assume that product markets are segmented and that
labor markets are made up of two groups of workers. Skilled workers are perfectly mobile
between the domestic regions, and immobile unskilled workers exist only in local supplies.
There are two kinds of sectors in the economy. The traditional sector requires one unit of
A in order to produce one unit of output in any region. This represents free trade in
traditional goods. In the other sector, the manufacturing sector, as in Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003), both skilled and unskilled workers are employed as production investments. We
assume that manufacturing technology requires one unit of L and ϕ units of local,
immobile, unskilled workers as ﬁxed costs. According to the NEG tradition, the marginal
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cost of production of variety is set to equal zero. Because the labor requirements of each
ﬁrm are identical across the three regions, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the ﬁrm and variety. Thus, the number of manufacturing ﬁrms or varieties produced in
region r equals the number of skilled workers. We denote the share of ﬁrms by λ∈0, 1
in the gate region of the home country.
n (r=G, H , R) means the variety of goods produced in region r. Under these
assumptions, labor market cleaning in each region implies that
n=λL, n=1−λL, n=L (4)
Then, we denote the market size of region r via M=A+L. Based on the foregoing
notation, each ﬁrmʼs proﬁt in region r, whose products are sold to the three regions, is
equal to the revenues from sales minus the costs of both types of labor.
π=Mpq+Mp−τq−w

 −ϕw

 , s≠r (5)
where the ﬁrst two terms refer to the ﬁrmʼs sales in local and other markets, and the last
two terms refer to local factorsʼ costs.
In the traditional sector, unskilled workers under the constant returns to scale produce
one variety of traditional goods. Like Picard and Zeng (2010), we assume that each worker
produces one unit of a traditional good. As the unskilled workers are supplied locally,
traditional goods are distinguished according to the local endowment of the production
factor.
. Market equilibrium
Each ﬁrm is assumed to choose its price by taking the price index as a given. Proﬁt
maximization implies optimal prices as follows :
Intraregional price :
p=
a+cP
2b+cN 
(6)
Interregional price :
p=p+
τ
2
(7)
Using the symmetry between ﬁrms, the aggregate price index (2) in region r can be
written as
P=


pvdv+


pvdv+


pvdv (8)
After solving for the price equilibrium, the equilibrium wages in the manufacturing
industry are determined by the zero proﬁt condition, as is usual in a perfect labor market.
Hence, there are no pure proﬁts, so all operating proﬁts are absorbed by the wage bill,
which implies that
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w =Mpq+Mp−τq−ϕw

 (9)
Because we assume that local factors are employed at unit productivity and zero
transport costs for traditional goods, perfect competition in the markets of the traditional
sector implies that the price of products is equal to the marginal costs. This means that
w=p

 (10)
The individual demands for traditional goods in any region are as follows :
q=1−p

=1−w

 (11)
The total demand for traditional products in region r is equal to qM . Here, M
(M=M+M+M) means the total market size of all three regions. The supply of this
good is equal to the number of units of local factor that are not used by manufacturing
ﬁrms. As a consequence of market clearing, we can obtain :
qM=A−λϕ (12)
Then, according to Equations (11) and (12), the wage of unskilled workers in region r can
be expressed as follows :
w=1−q

=1−
1
M
A−λϕ (13)
Based on the above analysis, the wage diﬀerential of unskilled workers between the gate
region and hinterland can be expressed as follows :
w−w

=
2ϕ
M
λ−
ϕ
M
(14)
We now determine the T and t conditions needed for trade to occur between any two
regions at these equilibrium prices. In particular, there will be two-way trade between
domestic regions as long as the price of manufacturing p can compensate for the
transport costs. That is to say, p−t≥0 as long as the transport costs are low enough.
Using the equilibrium price (6), there is trade between the two domestic regions if
t<t=
2a+cLT
2b+cL
(15)
As discussed in Behrens (2011), decreasing the international trade costs of T may well
spur interregional trade within the liberalizing country due to more manufacturing goods
being imported from the overseas market. For the same reason, the occurrence of
international trade between the gate region and region R means that p−T≥0.
Furthermore, the local factors should be large enough to supply the traditional sector. We
impose the following restrictions :
T<T=
2a
2b+cL
, A>λϕ (16)
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．Spatial Equilibrium
As shown in Ottaviano et al. (2002), the indirect utility of skilled workers in region r
can be written as follows :
V=S +S

+w

 +q  (17)
where
S =
aN
2b
−a


pvdv+
b+cN
2 


pv

dv−
c
2 


pvdv

(18)
is the individual consumption surplus of manufacturing goods, and S is the corresponding
surplus of traditional goods. The skilled workers are mobile between the domestic regions
and migrate between them according to the diﬀerence in indirect utility levels (ΔV). The
consumerʼs indirect utility diﬀerential between the domestic regions can be deﬁned as
follows :
ΔV λ=S −S

+w

−w

+S

−S

 (19)
Because the access to traditional varieties of goods in each region is same, the diﬀerential
of surplus in terms of traditional goods (S ) between any two regions is zero. Thus, the
indirect utility diﬀerential between the two domestic regions can be written as
ΔV λ=S −S

+w

−w

 for short.
Here, we assume that the home country and the rest of the world have an identical
market size (L=n+n=n≡n,N=2n, A=A+A=A) and that the unskilled workers
are evenly distributed between the domestic regions (A=A=A2). By using Equations
(6), (7), and (8), the equilibrium price index of the two domestic regions can be written
as
P=
2an+b+2cnnt+nT
2b+2cn
, P=
2an+b+2cnnt+nT+nt
2b+2cn
(20)
Based on some straightforward yet cumbersome calculation, we can obtain the diﬀeren-
tial of consumption surplus for manufacturing goods and the diﬀerential of skilled workersʼ
wages between the gate region and the hinterland as follows :
S −S

=
b+2cn
8ϕb+cn
 αt
+αt+4c
nTtλ+αTt (21)
α=−4b
n+8bcn<0 (21-1)
α=8abn+16acn
>0 (21-2)
α=−4c
n+8bcn+4bn<0 (21-3)
w−w

=
b+2cn
8ϕb+cn
 ζt
+ζt+ζTtλ+ψt+ψt
ψTt−
2ϕ
M
λ+
ϕ
M
(22)
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ζ=−4c
n+4Acn+4Abcn+4bcn+2bn<0 (22-1)
ζ=4abn>0 (22-2)
ζ=4bcn
+2cn>0 (22-3)
ψ=4Aab+4Aacn>0 (22-4)
ψ=−2Ab
+2Abcn<0 (22-5)
ψ=−2c
n+4bcn+2Acn+6Abcn+2bn+4Ab<0 (22-6)
where α, α, α, ζ, ζ, ζ, ψ, ψ, and ψ are bundles of parameters independent of trade and
transport costs.
According to Equations (21) and (22), we can explain where the agglomeration and
dispersion forces arise. The agglomeration forces can be observed in the ﬁrst bracketed
term in Equations (21) and (22). When the coeﬃcient of λ is positive, these terms
increase in λ. That is, when more skilled workers relocate to the gate region, the skilled
workersʼ wages and net surplus of manufacturing goods will increase correspondingly. To
go into more detail, agglomeration forces derive from the home market eﬀects, which are
caused by the demand linkage and the cost linkage. When more skilled workers agglomer-
ate in the gate region, the larger demand will increase the proﬁts of ﬁrms and then
improve the wages of skilled workers (see (21)). Meanwhile, more ﬁrms (skilled workers)
agglomerate in the gate region ; the ﬁerce competition lowers the price of a variety of
goods and increases the consumption surplus of manufacturing (see (22)). These agglom-
eration forces are called the second-nature force and are mentioned in Krugman (1991)
and Ottaviano et al. (2002).
Performing another role in the spatial equilibrium, the dispersion forces in our model
mainly derive from the product market crowding eﬀect. In addition, unskilled workers that
are employed in the manufacturing sector contribute to the spatial conﬁguration as another
centrifugal force. Firstly, when the coeﬃcient of λ is negative in the ﬁrst bracketed terms
in (21) and (22), more skilled workers agglomerate in the gate region, and the skilled
workersʼ wage and the net surplus of manufacturing decrease in λ. Indeed, when more
ﬁrms agglomerate in the gate region, the ﬁerce competition decreases the price of the
products and the skilled workersʼ wage. In particular, when trade costs T and transport
costs t are extremely large, the dispersion forces dominate the economic system. At the
same time, when more ﬁrms locate in the gate region, the skilled workersʼ wage decreases
in λ, as described in the second term in Equation (22). With more skilled workers locating
in the gate region, the larger demand increases the proﬁts of manufacturing ﬁrms. Because
unskilled workers are employed as ﬁxed costs as well as the skilled workers in the
manufacturing sector, the revenue of ﬁrms is equal to the wages of the skilled and
unskilled workers. The increase of the wage share of unskilled workers extrudes the
amount of wage that is allocated to skilled workers. This additional dispersion force
derived from the traditional sector has rarely been observed in prior papers, except those
of Picard and Zeng (2005 and 2010). When we detect the second term of Equation (22),
we note that it is independent of trade and transport costs. This means that even with full
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agglomeration in one region, dispersion could emerge again if the dispersion force in-
creases.
In the equilibrium, the skilled worker never intends to move to another location. When
there is a tiny marginal deviation from the equilibrium, the skilled workers still return to
the equilibrium state. We call such a state stable equilibrium. Formally, such a stable
spatial equilibrium can be expressed by using following (in) equalities :
λ∈0, 1 if ΔV=0 (23)
λ=0 if ΔV≤0 (24)
λ=1 if ΔV≥0 (25)
Such an equilibrium always occurs because ΔV is a continuous function of λ. The stable
equilibrium can be divided into interior and corner equilibriums. An interior equilibrium is
stable if and only if the slope of the utility diﬀerential equation (19) is non-positive in a
neighborhood of this equilibrium, whereas a corner equilibrium is stable if λ=1 and ΔV≥0
or λ=0 and ΔV≤0.
After substituting (21) and (22) into (19), the diﬀerential of indirect utility between the
gate region and the hinterland can be written as follows :
ΔV λ=θt+θt
+θtT−ηλ+φt+φt
+φtT+η (26)
where
θ=
b+2cn
8b+cn
 12abn+16acn
>0 (26-1)
θ=−
b+2cn
8b+cn
 4c
n+12bcn+4Acn+6bn+4Abcn<0 (26-2)
θ=
b+2cn
8b+cn
 4bcn
+6cn>0 (26-3)
φ=
b+2cn
8b+cn
 4Aab+4Aacn>0 (26-4)
φ=−
b+2cn
8b+cn
 2Ab
+2Abcn<0 (26-5)
φ=−
b+2cn
8b+cn
 6c
n+12bcn+2Acn+6Abcn+6bn+4Ab<0 (26-6)
η=
8b+cn

b+2cn
2ϕ
M
(26-7)
η=
8b+cn

b+2cn
ϕ
M
(26-8)
are bundles of constant parameters. Thus the diﬀerential of indirect utility between the
two domestic regions depends only on the two exogenous variables, transport costs, t, and
trade costs, T. We note that the utility diﬀerential is a simple linear function of λ.
Following the above-mentioned discussion, the distribution of skilled workers in the home
country can be shown as follows. According to Equations (23), (24), and (25), the
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agglomeration of skilled workers in the gate region is a stable equilibrium if and only if
ΔV 1>0. This means that the diﬀerential of utility in the gate region is larger than that
in the hinterland. Some straightforward calculations tell us that ΔV λ=1≥0 is equivalent
to :
ΔV=θ+φt
+θ+φ+θ+φTt−η>0 (27)
where
θ+φ=
b+2cn
8b+cn
 12abn+16acn
+4Aab+4Aacn>0 (27-1)
θ+φ=−
b+2cn
8b+cn
 4c
n+12bcn+4Acn+6bn+6Abcn+2Ab<0 (27-2)
θ+φ=−
b+2cn
8b+cn
 8bcn
+2Acn+6Abcn+6bn+4Ab<0 (27-3)
η=
8b+cn

b+2cn
ϕ
M
(27-4)
are parameters independent of transport and trade costs. If we write Ft , T=θ+φt

+θ+φ+θ+φTt−η, the foregoing condition can be written as Ft , T≥0. Simi-
larly, λ=0 is also a stable equilibrium if and only if ΔV 0≤0. The full agglomeration in
the hinterland means that skilled workers enjoy a lower indirect utility in the gate region.
This is equivalent to ΔV λ=0=φt
+φ+φTt+η<0. If we write Gt , T=φt

+φ+φTt+η, we can have Gt , T<0.
Finally, λ∈0, 1 is an interior stable equilibrium if and only if ΔV λ=0 and the
coeﬃcient of λ is negative in (26). For skilled workers, there is no incentive to move to
another location. Because ΔV=θt+θt
+θtT−ηλ+φt+φt
+φtT+η, these two
conditions for the interior stable equilibrium show that λ=
Gt , T
−H t , T
∈0, 1 and
H t , T<0, where H t , T=θt+θt
+θtT−η. This means that this condition is equal
to Gt , T>0 and Gt , T+H t , T<0. Also, because Ft , T=Gt , T+H t , T, the
foregoing conditions of spatial equilibrium, (23), (24), and (25), can be rewritten as follows :
λ=1 if Ft , T≥0 (28)
λ=0 if Gt , T<0 (29)
λ∈0, 1 if Gt , T>0 and Ft , T<0 (30)
Based on the above discussion, we then study the impacts of the asymmetrical geographi-
cal access on the national equilibrium during the trade liberalization and regional integra-
tion.
．The Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization and Regional Integration
Because Ft , T and Gt , T are functions of t and T, this allows us to investigate how
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Figure 2．The relationship between t and t T
T
t
0
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Ttrade
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international trade liberalization and regional integration aﬀect the distribution of manufac-
turing ﬁrms in the home country. For the sake of simplicity, the aim of this paper is to
focus on how regional integration may aﬀect the equilibrium distribution of manufacturing
ﬁrms in the country by assuming diﬀerentiated international trade environments. In other
words, we concentrate on the analysis of domestic transport cost t by assuming interna-
tional trade cost T to be a series of diﬀerent values. In addition, Ft , T and Gt , T are
quadratic function of t. When Ft , T and Gt , T are put in the same coordinate system,
we ﬁnd that the relationship between Ft , T and Gt , T mainly depends on the
locations of their corresponding symmetric axes, which are also related to T. Here, we
denote the symmetric axes of quadratic functions Ft , T and Gt , T to be t and t,
respectively. Thus, we can write t=
θ+φ+θ+φT
−2θ+φ
and t=
φ+φT
−2φ
, which can be
expressed as two lines in the plane of T , t. If we compare the slopes and intercepts of
the two lines, we can write
θ+φ
−2θ+φ
>
φ
−2φ
and
θ+φ
−2θ+φ
<
φ
−2φ
according to
the signs of the parameters in (26). Then, we can show these two lines in the following
ﬁgure.
As can be seen from Figure 2, When t= t, t=0, and t=0, we can obtain T*, T, and
T, respectively. The three points divide the horizontal axis into four intervals, i. e., 0, T*,
T*, T, T, T, and T, T. In the following discussion, we mainly focus on two
cases : when international trade costs are very high and when they are very low, i. e.,
T∈0, T* and T, T. The discussion of the other two cases, i. e., T∈T*, T and
T, T is given in Appendix A. The two cases to be discussed here are concerned with
the following two regional integrations.
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Figure 3．Industry location when T is very high
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. Regional Integration When a Country is Closed to the Global Markets
We ﬁrst investigate the impacts of domestic regional integration on countries that are
endowed with relatively closed international trade environments. To do so, we assume that
the international trade costs are suﬃciently high, i. e., T∈T, T. As shown in Figure
2, when T is in T, T, t and t have negative values of t simultaneously. This means
that the symmetrical axis of quadratic curves Ft , T and Gt , T both lie on left side of
the plane of t , ΔV . We can then depict them in the following ﬁgure, which involves the
relationship between Ft , T and Gt , T. As Figure (3a) shows, when t∈t, t, we
can see that Gt , T<0. This means that ΔV<0, and thus, λ=0 according to (29). When
λ=0, this means all the ﬁrms agglomerate in the hinterland. Following closely, in the
interval 0, t, we can see that Gt , T>0 and Ft , T<0 in Figure (3a). Thus, we have
λ∈0, 1 according to Equation (30). Because function λt=Gt−H t is a monotonic
and continuous function of t and the endpoints are λ0=12 and λt=0, we then know
that when t∈0, t, this interior solution λ is larger than 0 and smaller than 12. Based
on the foregoing discussion, the relationship can be drawn in Figure (3b), and the
aforementioned results can be summarized as follows.
Consider a country with two asymmetrical domestic regions and very high international
trade costs, i. e., T∈T, T. When interregional transport costs, t, are extremely high,
all manufacturing ﬁrms will locate in the hinterland so as to avoid competition from rest of
the world. When transport costs decrease considerably, ﬁrms will move from the hinter-
land to the gate region until an even distribution is reached.
. Regional Integration When a Country is Open to Global Markets
In contrast to the previous subsection, here, we attempt to investigate the eﬀects of
regional integration on the space economy in a home country characterized by advanta-
geous international trade environments. This implies that international trade costs are
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Figure 4．Industrial location when T is very low
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extremely low, i. e., T∈0, T* and that there is a large volume of trade between the
home country and global markets. As can be seen from Figure 2, when T∈0, T*, t and
t are both positive, and t is located on the right side of t. In addition, when t>t, it
can be veriﬁed that the larger roots of equation Ft , T=0 are larger than those of
Gt , T=0 (see Appendix B). In this circumstance, we can show an explicit relationship
between ΔV and t in Figure (4a). Whent∈t, t, we know that Gt , T<0, as shown
in Figure (4a). As argued in the previous subsection, we can have λ=0 according to
Equation (29). As transport costs gradually decrease, when t∈t, t, we can see that
Gt , T>0 and Ft , T<0, as shown in Figure (4a). This then implies that 0<λ<1 based
on (30). When t surpasses t, there exists an interval t, t, and we can obtain
Ft , T>0 from Figure (4a). As can be seen from (28), we now have λ=1. With the
further decrease of transport costs, Figure (4a) tells us that Gt , T>0 and Ft , T<0
when t∈0, t. As occurred in the interval of t, t, this satisﬁes the condition of
0<λ<1 in accordance with (30). Here, as discussed in the foregoing subsection, λt is a
monotonic and continuous function of t, and the endpoints are λ0=12 and λt=0. We
then know that when t∈0, t, this interior solution λ is larger than 12 and smaller than
1. To sum up, the relationship between λ and t is illustrated in Figure (4b).
Based on the foregoing discussion, we can summarize that when the home country is
open to global markets, i. e., T∈0, T*, the migration of the home country adopts several
spatial patterns. When transport costs are high, similar to the situation described in
Subsection 4.1, when the trade costs are high, all ﬁrms will locate in the hinterland. The
gradual decrease in transport costs will trigger the ﬁrms to move to the gate region,
where they can save on the trade costs for exporting goods to global markets. There is an
interval, i. e., t, t, in which a full agglomeration in the gate region will happen during
the regional integration. With further decreases in transport costs, ﬁrms will relocate again
and move from the gate region to the hinterland, where the wage of unskilled workers is
lower. Eventually, an even distribution of ﬁrms between the two regions occurs.
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. Interpretation and discussion
The aforementioned analytical results show the impacts of regional integration and trade
liberalization on the space economy of the home country. Firstly, when trade costs are
suﬃciently high, the spatial economy has a full agglomeration of industries in the hinter-
land and then experiences a process of dispersion until an even industrial distribution
between the two domestic regions occurs during regional integration. Secondly, when trade
costs are very low and transport costs are high, industrial ﬁrms will ﬁrst concentrate in
the hinterland, but a decrease in transport costs will trigger a relocation of ﬁrms from the
hinterland to the gate region until a full agglomeration occurs in the gate region, which
will be sustained for a good while. With a further decrease in transport costs, regional
integration will result in an even spatial distribution of ﬁrms between the two regions. In
our model, the domestic regions are endowed with asymmetric accessibility to the external
world market, which reﬂects the reality in many countries, such as Mexico and China.
This allows us to give a more realistic explanation for the spatial evolution in many
developing countries. As shown in Krugman and Elizondo (1996), high trade costs caused
manufacturing ﬁrms to concentrate in the Mexico City region, which is far away from the
US-Mexico border. However, during the rapid trade liberalization, a large share of industry
relocated to the US border region. Meanwhile, Gallup et al. (1999) ﬁnd that when domestic
regions are poorly integrated, the population is agglomerated in the hinterland rather than
in the coastal areas. This is supported by the fact that a greater share of the people live
away from coastal regions in Sub-Saharan African. This paperʼs analytical results also show
how industrial ﬁrms are relocated to the gate region. In this way, as Fujita and Hu (2001)
point out, economic development in China has caused a strong agglomeration toward the
coastal regions. This can be attributed to the fact that the coastal regions in China are
endowed with better accessibility for exporting goods to global markets. The asymmetric
considerations in our model not only explain why economic agglomeration occurs but also
show where agglomeration arises.
In the literature, asymmetry in terms of accessibility has been employed in other recent
papers (Crozet and Koenig Soubeyran, 2004 ; Behrens et al., 2006). Unlike Crozet and
Koenig Soubeyran, we successfully show the analytical results. Moreover, international
trade costs and interregional transport costs are considered simultaneously in order to
investigate their impacts on the space economy of a country. In the present model, skilled
workers and unskilled workers are both hired in the manufacturing sector. The employ-
ment of unskilled workers in manufacturing ﬁrms constitutes another dispersion force that
generates redispersion during economic integration. In Behrens et al. (2006), ﬁrms would
always concentrate in the gate region when the domestic regions were well-integrated, but
they failed to show industrial redispersion. Concerning industrial redispersion, since Wil-
liamson (1965), reasons behind the disparity between regions (countries) in terms of
divergence and convergence have always been debated. During the initial period of
industrialization, manufacturing ﬁrms tend to agglomerate in some special regions or major
cities and then experience a process of deconcentration. In Brazil, some industries have
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relocated from the metropolitan areas of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro to the adjacent
areas of Santa Catarina and Minas Gerais, as discussed by Haddad and Peroblli (2003a and
2003b). Even in some small countries, such as South Korea, Kwon (1985) pointed out that
plants were relocated from the core metro areas of Seoul, Pusan, and Taegu and their
satellite cities to the rest of the country. The impetus for this deconcentration is mainly
derived from the improvement in infrastructure and economic liberalization that occurred
after the 1970s in South Korea. In China, the growth rate of per capita GDP exhibited
some convergence between the late 1990s and 2006, when there was a large gap between
the hinterland and coastal regions (Fan and Sun, 2008). This recent empirical evidence
suggests that the improvements in transport infrastructure have eﬀects in terms of
attracting industries to periphery regions or hinterlands.
In previous papers, the process of industrial redispersion has been obtained by using
urban costs and various investment mechanisms (Tabuchi, 1998 ; Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002).
In the real world, the dispersion forces generated from the employment of unskilled
workers seem to be more widely observed in developing countries. Picard and Zeng
(2005) investigated the process of industrial redispersion by considering the agricultural
sector and a diﬀerent production function. Compared with their symmetrical two-region
model, our model also takes into account the considerations of asymmetry in terms of
accessibility. The results obtained in our paper seem to approach nearer to the real
economy. The previous models of industrial redispersion oﬀer reasonable mechanisms to
explain the occurrence of industrial deconcentration, but their weak point is that they fail
to describe where the agglomeration occurs and where the deconcentration comes from. In
China, during the past three decades, the eastern coastal provinces, with better accessibil-
ity for exporting goods, have dominated the inlands and become the core region during
economic liberalization and development. Moreover, in the past ten years, industrial
redispersion has been observed. Our model not only gives an explanation of where the
industrial agglomeration occurs but also where the redispersion comes from by considering
asymmetrical regions.
．Conclusions
The importance of geography itself has always been ignored in the previous NEG
studies designed to investigate industrial location during economic integration. Despite the
attention given to the role of market access in shaping the landscape of the economy in
developed countries, little concern is paid to developing countries, particularly in the ﬁeld
of theoretical work. In this paper, it is assumed that the hinterland must go through the
gate region to access to overseas markets, and the rest of the world is considered to be an
overseas market. To better reveal the current situation in developing countries, we
assumed that unskilled workers are employed both in the manufacturing sector and the
traditional sector, as did in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). As a result, industrial redisper-
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sion was analytically derived within our framework.
We found that when the home country is closed to overseas markets, the high
interregional transport costs allow the hinterland to attract all of manufacturing ﬁrms.
However, with the suﬃcient integration of the domestic economy, there will be a balanced
distribution of industry between the gate region and the hinterland. When the home
country is open enough to world markets, the ﬁrms initially agglomerate in the hinterland
and then gradually move to the gate region until a full concentration occurs during the
integration of the domestic regions. With further regional economic integration, half of
ﬁrms will relocate to the hinterland again, with the other half of them remaining in the
gate region. Thus, industrial redispersion occurs.
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Appendix A:
(A-1) The Case of T*<T<T1
We know that t>t>0 according to the analysis in Figure 2. The possible relationship
between diﬀerential of indirect utility and transport costs and the corresponding industrial
patterns are depicted in Figure A1. Starting from full agglomeration in the hinterland, a
gradual decrease in transport cost t causes the industrial ﬁrms to catastrophically (or
gradually) move to the gate region and remain in a symmetric distribution between the
two regions eventually.
Figure A1．Industry location and interregional transport costs
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(A-2) The Case of T1<T<T2
In Figure 2, we know that t>0 and t<0. There are two possible relationships between
Ft and Gt when their symmetrical axes are ﬁxed, which is shown in Figure A2. In
this case, full agglomeration is the main location pattern. The agglomeration of ﬁrms ﬁrst
occurs in the hinterland and then either in the hinterland or the gate region. However,
further decreases in interregional transport costs trigger the gradual symmetric distribu-
tion of industrial ﬁrms between the two domestic regions.
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Figure A2．Industry location and interregional transport costs
t
¾V
0
t4
t3 t2t1 ttrade
G (t, T )
F (t, T )
⒜
1
2
t
Ê
0
1
t4 t1 t2 ttrade
⒝
t
¾V
0
t4
t3 t2t1 ttrade
F (t, T )
G (t, T )
⒞
1
2
t
Ê
0
1
t1 t2t4 ttrade
⒟
Appendix B :
We can write Ft=at+bt−η and Gt , T=a′t+b′t+η, where a=θ+φ<0,
b=θ+φ+θ+φT>0 ; a′=φ<0, b′=φ+φT>0, and η>0. The larger root values of
Ft=0 and Gt=0 can be written as t =
b+ b+4aη
−2a
and t=
b′+ b′−4a′η
−2a′
,
respectively.
Thus, t−t

 = b′−2a′ +
 b′−4′aη
−2a′ −
b
−2a
+
 b+4aη
−2a 
=
b′
−2a′
−
b
−2a +
 b′−4a′η
−2a′
−
 b+4aη
−2a  (B1)
During the interval of 0, T*, s is larger than s, as shown in Figure A1. This means
that the symmetrical axis of Gt is located on the right side of Ft and that
b′
−2a′
>
b
−2a
for equations Ft=0 and Gt=0. We then know that the ﬁrst term in
(B1) is positive. In addition,   b′
−4a′η
−2a′ 

−  b
+4aη
−2a 

=
b′−4a′η
4a′
−
b+4aη
4a
=
b′
4a′
−
b
4a
−
a+a′
a′a η. Noting that
b′
−2a′
>
b
−2a
>0, a<0, a′<0, and η>0, it is readily
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veriﬁable that
b′
4a′
−
b
4a
−
a+a′
a′a η>0. Then, we can deduce that the second term in
(B1) is also positive. It is equivalent to t>t

 . Additionally, when t=0, Ft<0, and
Gt>0, we are able to depict the parabolas of functions Ft and Gt in the same
coordinate axis, as shown in Figure 2.
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